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ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT, FIRST DISTRICT.
CHICAGO AND WESTERN INDIANA

R.

Co. v. COGGSWELL.

Eminent Domain-Change in Plan of Construction, after
Assessment of Damages- Damages to Proberty not
taken-Surface Road changed to Elevaled Road.
SYLLABUS.
Change of plan of the public work contemplated, after assessment
of damages, inflicting new damages not embraced in the former assessment, will entitle the owner to additional compensation therefor.
But where there was no restriction in the original assessment as to
the plan of the work. the doctrine of res fudicata will apply, and all
damages caused by the improvement proposed will be held embraced in
the original assessment.
But a change of grade of a proposed railway after assessment from
a surface road to an elevated road, is such a change as would not be embraced in the former assessment ; and is ground for further proceedings.
Damages cannot be recovered by the owner of property by reason of
what is done upon adjacent property, unless the same results in a physical injury to the property of claimant.
The measure of damages to property not taken for injuries done by
public works is determined by comparing its value before and after the
work is done which causes the injury.

The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the
Court.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
WATERMAN, P. J.-In i88o, appellee was the owner
of a ten-acre tract of land in the town of Cicero, Cook County,
Illinois, which was bounded on the north by Madison street,
on the south by the centre line of Jackson Street, extended,
and on the west by what would have been the centre line
of West Forty-sixth Street if West Forty-sixth Street had
been extended south of Madison Street.
Appellee's land which, including streets, was 333 feet
east and west, by 1,320 feet north and south. Appellant
being a railroad company, had, under an ordinance of the
town of Cicero, granting it the right to do so, constructed
and was operating a surface railroad, which ran north and
south, immediately west of and adjoining the west line of
appellee's land.
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While thus operating said railroad and while under the
ordinances of the town of Cicero, said railroad was permitted
to cross Madison Street-" keeping and maintaining all
street crossings in good condition and so that the same
might be easily crossed in all directions" "without danger
to person or property ;" the railroad company condemed
the west thirty-three feet (or one acre) of appellee's land,
for the purpose of its right of way, thus making its right of
way sixty-six feet wide. At the time of the trial of the
condemnation case in 1884, a jury was waived, and the
judge viewed the premises; the surface road was there
and in operation at that time; the finding awarded the
value of one acre, and declared the remaining nine acres
would not be damaged; judgment was entered on the
finding, the money was paid, and the appellant went into
possession. In i885 the appellant procured a new ordinance granting it the right to erect a viaduct over Madison Street and to construct its- approach thereto from the
south, and in 1885 it so constructed said viaduct and approach ; that the structure was about eighteen feet high at
Madison Street and about eight feet high at the south line
of appellee's land. Appellee claims there was no authority
of law at the time of the condemnation proceeding to consider the damages to the remainder by reason of an elevated structure, and that this is such a change of plans as
authorizes, under the law, the recovery of such additional
damages as the evidence shows was caused by such change.
The questions presented in this record, briefly stated,
are: Where in condemnation proceeding instituted by a
railroad, the damage to property not taken has once been
judicially ascertained, and thereafter the grade of the road
opposite such property is raised from eight to seventeen
feet and thereby the value of the property is lessened ; is
the owner of such property entitled to additional compensation ?
That a recovery may be had for damages caused by a
change in the plan of construction with respect to which
damages were originally assessed, is established both upon
principle and authority.
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The reason is obvious. The property owner is entitled,
in the absence of anything showing how the road is to be
constructed or used, to such damages as it is reasonably
probable will ensue from the construction and operation of
the road: C. B. & N. R. R. Co. v. Bowman.' If the road
desires to stipulate for any particular mode of construction
or operation, and have an assessment of damages limited
to such mode, it has a right to do so.'
. Manifestly, then, damages having been assessed upon
the basis of a certain plan of construction, if a change is
made to another mode, the property owner is entitled to
such additional damages, if any, as arise from a manner
of construction, concerning which there has been no assessment or payment of damages.'
It follows, therefore, that damages done to land, not
taken, having once been assessed, when additional damages
are claimed upon the allegation that the assessment which
has been had was upon the basis of a special mode of construction or operation which has since been departed from;
the first question for determination is with reference to
what special kind of construction or operation were the
damages in the first litigation had? I- other words, what
are the sources from which the damages once awarded
sprang?
If in the former proceeding there was no restriction
whatever; if damages were then assessed for everything
which it was reasonably probable would ensue from the
taking and use of certain land for railroad purposes, then
there can be no. additional damages from the use for the
same purpose of the same land.
It does not appear that in the former proceeding any
particular mode of- construction was stipulated for, or that'
' 122 Ill., 595.
'C. & A. R. R. Co. v. J. L. & A. Ky. Co., io5 Ill., 388; Jacksonville
& Savanna R. R. Co. v. Kidder, 21 Ill., 1,i1; Hayes v. Ottawa, Oswego &
Fox River Valley R. R. Co., 54 Ill., 373.
3'Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. v. McDougall, 118 Ill., 229-238;
Same v. Same, 126 I1l., III-12o; C. &A.R. R. Co. v.J. L. & A. Ry. Co.,
105 Ill., 388; Peoria & Rock Island Ry. Co. v. Birk, etc., 62 Ill., 332.
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any special plan was submitted ; but it is shown that the
judge before whom the cause was tried, a jury having been
waived, inspected the premises and saw that the road was
then constructed and passed the premises now under consideration at about the natural surface of the ground.
Were, then, the damages proceeding in the former
assessed with a view to the existence of a surface road only ?
In St. Louis, Jacksonville and Chicago Railway Co. v.
Mitchell, 47 Ill., 165, it was held in a proceeding to obtain
the right of way across certain lands, that for the purpose
of reducing the damages, evidence should have been admitted to show that the company had contracted for the
building of a fence through the land, and had provided the
lumber therefor. It would seem from this that if the jury
had visited the premises and found a fence already constructed by the company, they would have been bound to
take such fact into consideration in arriving at their verdict.
In Carpenter v. Eastern & Amboy R. R. Co.,' it
appeared that the commissioners to assess damages from
the taking and use of a right of way for a railroad,
proposed to be located through a farm, were informed by
agents of the company that the road would pass over the
farm by an iron bridge supported by abutments, and assessed damages, and a settlement was made upon that
understanding. The road having changed its intention
and concluded to cross the farm by a "fill," the Court
upon this state of facts held that the owner was entitled to
recover such increased compensation as was equal to the
increased damage.
In Boyd v. Negley," it is said that when a petitioner adopts a grade before the damages are assessed,
and marks the grade upon grade-pins along the route,
these having been seen by the jury, it must be presumed
to have assessed such damages as would be caused by
the construction of a road with the grade marked and
'24 N.

J. Eq.

253 Penn. State, 3 8 7 .
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with the filling or embankments indicated. It is questionable whether, in view of the proximity of Madison Street,
which the road crossed; appellant had at the time of the
former proceedings any such authority from the town of
Cicero, in which these lands were, as would have enabled
it to have passed the premises of appellee upon any grade
save one nearly that of the natural surface. The ordinance
authorizing the construction of a viaduct seems to have
been passed September 26, 1885; the judgment in the
former proceeding was entered May 31, 1884. We are, for
these reasons, of the opinion that damages must be presumed to have been in the former proceeding assessed upon
the basis of a road passing the premises of appellee at
about the natural surface grade. The change of construction that has been made since the former proceeding, is that
the road passing and near to the premises of appellee, has
been raised, an embankment having been constructed,
varying in height from eight to seventeen feet; this embankment has been constructed and the road runs upon
land which the company own in fee.
What are elements that may be considered in ascertaining the sum, if any, which appellant is entitled to recover
because of the building of this embankment and the running of trains thereon?
Any real property may be damaged or benefited by
what is done upon property adjacent to it or in the vicinity.
As the owner cannot be called upon to pay private individuals or corporations for the benefit which may come
to his property from the construction by them of manufactories or fine dwellings in the vicinity of his premises ; so
there are certain depreciations in the value of his lands for
which, arising as they may, from things which every owner
of property had a right to do, he cannot claim compensation.
If an unsightly structure be erected, or suffered to
remain in a beautiful residence neighborhood, its tendency
is to depreciate the value of surrounding property, but it is
not a damage for which a recovery can be had.
So, too, a beautiful view, the prospect which one has

OPINION OF THE COURT.

from his windows, adds to the value of his home, and positive damage is done when his neighbor, by the rearing of a
lofty structure, shuts out all sight of the pleasant landscape;
but the law affords for such damage no redress.
The maxim, "Sic Wdere tuo ut alienum non laedas," in
its practical application, means only that one in the use of
his own property must not infringe upon the lawful rights
of others.
Had the strip of land to the west of appellee's premises,
upon which this railroad runs, been owned by a private
citizen, he might have built thereon an embankment or a
wall seventeen or forty feet high, without rendering himself
liable to appellee for the loss of view he had thus caused, or
the difficulties he had thrown in the way of the opening of
streets running through and west of the premises of appellee.
So, too, such private owner, in an uninhabited neighborhood, such as this was, might have built upon his premises
a saw-mill, an ice-house, cattle-sheds or other structures
undesirable in a fine residence neighborhood, but whose
erection would have been a lawful use and one of which
the appellee could not have successfully complained in a
court of justice.
Buildings and works of this class might have been
entirely inconsistent with the use to which appellee designed
to put his property. They might have rendered. his property less or more valuable than it otherwise would have
been, might practically have put money in or taken it from
his pocket, yet he would not in either case have been called
npon to pay or been entitled to receive compensation.
We understand that the Constitution and laws of this
State, so far as compensation is concerned, place the taking
and use of property for public purposes in the condition that
exists with respect to private use. The owner of property
taken or held for public purposes, if he devote his property
to any use which would be a nuisance, or would be actionable if done by a private citizen, may be made to pay just
compensation for the damage done to the property of others
by such use; but the liability of the owner of property de-
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voted to public uses is no greater than is that of the owner
of property held for private purposes; the right of one to
use without being liable for damage is the equal of the
other.
In Rigney v. the City of Chicago,' the Court says:
"There are certain injuries which are necessarily incident
to the ownership of property in towns or cities, which
directly impair the value of private property, for which
the law does not and never has afforded any relief. For
instance, the building of a jail, police station or the like
will generally cause adirect depreciation in the value of
neighboring property, yet that is clearly a case of damnum
absque hnjnria."
And further, in the same case, the Court said: "In all
cases, to warrant a recovery, it must appear there has been
some direct physical disturbance of a right, either public or
private, which the plaintiff enjoys in connection with his
property, and which gives to it an additional value, and that
by reason of such disturbance he has sustained a special
damage with respect to his property in excess of that sustained by the public generally."
To the same effect are the cases of City of Chicago v.
Union Building Association,' City of Olney v. Wharf,3 Hall
z,.
Mayor of Bristol,' Chamberland v. West End Ry. Co 5
The erection of an embankment upon the premises of
appellee, no right of access or approach having been disturbed, did not, nor does the mere running of cars thereon
constitute a physical disturbance of any of appellee's rights.
The Court ought not therefore to have permitted evidence of damage because of the erection of an embankment,
to have been given to the jury. So far as appears, appellee
never had any rights touching the construction of an embankment upon the premises of appellant, or to have his,
appellee's, land left so that streets could be cut across it
1102 II1., 64-80.

210o2111., 379-39-11H
5 Ill., 519.
'2 Law Repts. C. P. C., 322.
5io R. C. L., 704.
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without going under a railroad track, or to have the strip
of land lying wvest of his grounds occupied by undesirable
structures, or such as would depreciate the value of his
property.
Appellee; we presume, did have the right that dust,
smoke and cinders should not be thrown upon his premises;
such action upon the part either of a private individual or
the public, it is quite likely, would have been a direct
physical disturbance of a right which appellee had in connection with his property; for such disturbance upon the
part of an individual, the law has always afforded a remedy;
and in this State since the adoption of our present Constitution, providing that private property shall not be damaged for public use without just compensation, a remedy is
given to the owner for such interference, whether by or for
the public, or by private individuals.
Our attention has been called to the language of the
Supreme Court, repeatedly used, that in cases arising under
the provisions.of the Constitution relative to the damaging
of property for public use, "the depreciation is determined
by comparing its value before and after the structure is
made which produces the injury."
As applied to the facts of the cases in which such language was used, it was correct and applicable. Such language has not, however, so far as we are aware, been used
in a case like the present, or in any instance where an attempt had been made to recover damages for the doing for
public purposes of that for which, if done for private uses,
no action would have lain.
In the former proceeding damages were awarded to the
owner of these premises for the taking of a strip of land,
thirty-three feet wide, adjacent to and west of the land now
under consideration, and an adjudication was also had as to
the damage which, as the owner of these premises, it was
reasonably probable he would sustain from such taking and
from the construction and operation of a railroad as then
proposed and indicated; that included such throwing of
smoke, cinders and dust upon these premises as it was

534

CHICAGO

AND W.

INDIANA R.

CO.

71.

COGGSWELL.

reasonably probable would ensue from a railroad running at
about the natural surface of the ground. If the subsequent
elevation of the *track causes any more than this quantity
of cinders, etc., to be cast upon the premises of appellee,
and thereby he suffers an additional damage, he is entitled
to recover therefor.
In saying what we have as to the throwing of dust,
cinders, etc., upon the premises of appellee, we do not wish
to be understood as prejudging the case at bar. Upon another trial, as in all cases of this kind, the right to recover
for interference with an alleged right appurtenant to property must necessarily depend upon the existence of the
rights asserted. In this respect the rights as to property
vary with the situation, surroundings, etc. If a person erect
a dwelling-house in the immediate vicinity of a blast furnace
and rolling-mill, it would hardly be contended that, having
seen fit to go and make his home in such a neighborhood,
he would be entitled to enjoin the proprietors of the furnace
from filling the air with smoke or from disturbing the
serenity of his repose by the loud and jarring noise the
carrying on of their works necessarily involved.
Every person has a right to the reasonable enjoyment
of his property. What is a reasonable use of one's property must necessarily depend upon the circumstances of each
case; for a use for a particular purpose and in a particular
way, in one locality, might be lawfil, and a nuisance in another'
It is urged that the conclusion arrived at in the former
proceeding that these lands would not be damaged by the
construction of this road running at about the natural surface grade, must have been upon the theory that the benefit
derived from the opportunity thus afforded for switch connection from manufactories and coal yards that might be
located on these lands, equaled anyv daiage incident to its
construction and operation. Appellee insists that there is
Barnes v. Hawthorn, 54 Me., 124: Wier's Appeal, 74 Penn St., 230;
Banmford v. Tuniley, 3 B. & S., 62 ; Tipping z. St. Helen's Smelting Co.,
4 B. & S., 6oS.
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no opportunity for switch connection from his premises

with the road as now constructed, and that consequently
his lands do not now have a benefit considered in the
former proceeding.
Upon what theory the Court came to the conclusion
arrived at in the former proceeding, we cannot know.
By the former judgment it was established that these
lands were not damaged by the road as it then existed.
By the change of grade which has since been made,
the right to have switch connections has not been. taken
away. No switch connections have been destroyed; the
property was then and is now vacant and occupied.
All that had been done in this regard is that the
present grade may require that the manufactories, etc.,
hereafter located on these premises, shall, in order to have
useful switch connections, be constructed with reference to
the present situation; such cofistruction may be more expensive and may be more or less advantageous than one
"adapted to switch connection with a road running at a
natural surface grade.
It is not difficult to see that there may be advantages
or disadvantages in having a railroad pass one's premises
upon a viaduct seventeen feet high rather than upon the
surface of the ground.
All these things may be properly taken into consideration in the case, it being borne in mind that a recovery can
be had only for such damages, if any, as are in addition to
any that arose from the road when running at about the
natural surface; and that damages can only be awarded for
a direct physical disturbance of a right which the property
owner has in respect to his property, a right which exists
in respect to the use for private as well as public purposes
of other property.
The judgment of the Circuit Court will be reversed
and the cause remanded.
Reversed and remanded.
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ADDITIONA.L DAMAGES FOR CHANGE OF PLAN.
In many ways the first three propositions laid down in the opinion
and noted in the head-notes, relating to additional damages by
change of the plan of the proposed
improvement, serve to point out the
incompleteness of the statutory requirements and conditions imposed
upon parties seeking to exercise
the power of the government to
take property for public use. A
short remedy is to require that the
party seeking to exercise this power
file a plat with plans and specifications of the improvement, notify the
world thereof, and then be held to
that plan. In Illinois this result
has been reached by a series of
decisions: Jacksonville, etc., R. Co.
v. Kidder, 21 Ill., 131; St. Louis,
etc., R. Co. v. Mitchell, 47 Ill., 165 ;
Peoria, etc., R. Co. z,. Birkett, 62
Ill., 332; Peoria, etc., R. Co. v. P,
& Farmington R. Co., io 5 111., iio;
Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. Chicago & Evanston R. Co., Ii2 Ill.,
589; Ill. & St. L. R. & Coal Co, v.
Switzer, 117 Ill-, 399 ; Wabash, St.
L. & P. R. Co. v. McDougal, iiS
Ill., 229; S. C., 126 Ill., iii.
And in these cases it is held that
the party exercising the power and
filing the plan cannot afterwards
substantially deviate from the plan
on the basis of which the compensation was estimated without being
liable for any damage which results
from such change.
This has long been the rule both
by statute and judicial construction
in cases of municipal improvements
by special assessment, and should
be so, and frequently is, in the kindred condemnation cases.
For rule in special assessment
cases, see, Kneeland v. Furlong, 20
Wis., 437; Houghton v. Burnham,

22 Wis., 3o ; City of Springfield v.

Mathers, 124 Ill., 88; Pearce v.
Hyde Park, 126 Ill., 287; I Starr &
Curtis, Ill. Statutes C. 24,
135.
For similar rule in condemnation proceedings, see, Lancaster v.
Kennebec Log, etc., Co., 62 Me.,
272; In re N. Y. & Boston R.. Co.,
62 Barb., 85; Indianapolis, etc., R.
Co. v. Reed, 52 Ind., 357 ; Convers
v. G. R. & I. R.. Co., iS Mich., 459;
Warren v. Spencer Water Co., 143
Mass., 9; Kenein v. Arlington, 144
Mass., 456; Woodbury v. Marblehead Water Co., 145 Mass., 509;
Hamor v. Bar Harbor Water Co.,
78 Me., 127; In re Boston re R. Co.,
io Abb. N. C., 104; N. Y. & A. R.
Co. v. N. Y., & C. R. Co., i i Abb.
N. C., 386.
The requirement of the law as to
description of improvement cannot
be disregarded: Riddle v. Animas,
etc., R. Co., 5 Col., 230; Heck v.
School District, 49 .Mich., 55 1; Darlington v. U. S., 82 Pa. St., 382;
Williams v. Hartford, etc., R.. Co.,
13 Conn., 397.
Proceedings for one work cannot
be made to cover a new and different work. Damages assessed on
one basis cannot be made to embrace injuries inflicted by work on
another and different basis.
Where there was no restriction of
plan in the original work the damages must be held to have been assessed for any work coming within
the terms of the work as proposed.
A fundamental change in the
character of work, such as in the
fair interpretation of language
would not be embraced in the description of the work proposed, may
be the basis of a fresh assessment
of damages even where no restriction of plan existed in the original.
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Concerning this last rule, we may
suggest that the party seeking to
condemn property files a petition
describing the proposed work. This
description is part of a pleading and
should be construed like other
pleadings, most strongly against
the pleader: i Chitty Pleading, 261
and cases cited.
It may be objected that this rule
applies during the continuance of
the suit, and that after judgment,
under the rule of resjudicata,they
should be construed broadly to embrace everything involved in the
issue.
There are two answers to this.
First, the latter rule applies to the
fudgment itself, but not to the
pleadings on which it is based.
Secondly, the judgment in condemnation proceedings operates not
only as a satisfaction of past injuries but as a license for future acts,
and the effect is therefore continuing as to the thing licensed; and
affords no license for another and
different thing.
The short point decided is, therefore, that a change of grade in a
railway is in itself a source of damage to property for which damages
should be assessed, and is so where
damages for location have been
previously assessed, just as it would
be if no previous proceedings for
other purposes had occurred.
The proposition that a change of
plan, causing fresh damages after
the assessment of damages has been
had, is ground for fresh recovery,
has been laid down in the following cases, as well as those cited in
the opinion: McCormick v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 57 Mo., 433;
Kansas City, etc., R. Co. z,. Kregelo,
32 Kan., 6o8; Hill v. Mohawk & H.
R. Co., 7 N. Y., 152, 157; Carpenter v. Eastman, etc., R. Co., 24 N.

J. Eq.,

249, 40S; 26 N. J. Eq., x68;
Wabash St. L. & P. R. Co. v. McDougall, 118 Ill., 229-238; s. c., on
further hearing, 126 Ill., iii.
In the latter case the Court says:
"In an original proceeding to condemn the measure of damages is
the difference between the value of
the land as a whole, before and after
the construction of the road built
according to the plan proposed."
Chi. & P. R. Co. v. Francis, 70 Ill.,
235; Page v. Chi., etc., R. Co., 70
Ill.,324; Eberhart v. Chi., etc., R.
Co., 70 Ill., 347; Dupuis v. Chi. &
North Wisconsin R. Co., ri5 Ill.,
97; C. B. & N. R. Co. v. Bowman,
122 Ill-, 595.
"If, after damages
have been assessed, or settled by
agreement, a change in the plan of
construction involving more damages is made, the owner may demand a new assessment as to such
increase of damages.'; Mills on
Eminent Domain, 219.
A legislative precedent for this
doctrine may be found in the numerous Mill Acts authorizing the
compulsory flooding of lands for
milling purposes on payment of
compensation. Very early in the

history of Virginia

(1792),

the

Legislature provided that. the
owner of a mill dam might raise
his dam by suing out a second -writ
to assess the first damages (i Va.
St. at Large, N. S., 136, 137, Va.
Abr. Pub. Laws, 1796, p. 209, 211).
And the original writ required an
assessment of damages so far as
they.could be foreseen, upon view.
This is preserved in the present
Act. Code of Va., 1875, Title I9,
C. 63, S. Ii.
And damages by
breaking of the dam are recoverable at law as unforeseen (Wroe v.
Harris, 2 Wash., 126). See also
the similar statute and rule in Indiana (Honenstine v. -Vaughan, 7
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Black, 520). Andthis was followed
in many of the Southern and Western States. See Gould on Waters,
Ch. XIV, ? 6o, et seq.
The general rule of law, that
where a permanent grade of a
highway is established, the body
changing the grade-of the street
is liable for damages caused by
the change, is recognized by numerous authorities, in those States
which admit of any recovery of
damages caused by authorized
public works to proberty not
taken.
Goodall v. Milwaukee, 5 Wis., 32;
Pearce v. Milwaukee, 18 Wis., 428 ;
Goodrich v Milwaukee, 24 Wis.,
422 ; Crossett v. Janesville, 28 Wis.,
420; Dore v. Milwaukee, 42 Wis.,
io8; Rigney v. Chicago, 102 Ill.,
64 ; E. St. Louis v,. Lockhead, 7 Ill,
App. 83 ; B. St. Louis v. O'Flynn,
19 Ill., App. 64; Caledonian Ry.
Co. v. Walker's Trustees, L. R., 7
App. Cases, 259 ; Leader v. Moxon,
A.D. 1773, 3 Wils., 461, S. C., 2 Bl.,
924; Rhodes v. Cleveland, io Ohio
Rep., i59; M. Combs v. Akron, 15
Ohio Rep., s. c., i8 Ohio Rep.;
Combs v. Pittsburgh, iS Penn.
Rep., 187.
Contra: Governor & Co. of
British Cast Plate Mfrs. z. Meredith, A. D. 1792, 4 T. R., 794; Sutton v. Clark, 6 Taunt, 28; Jones v.
Bird, 5 B. & Ald., 837 ; Callender
v. Marsh, i Pick, 417; Rude v.
St. Louis, 93 Mo., 408; Keasy v.
Louisville, 4 Dana kKy.), 154;
Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, i
Humple (Tenn.), 403; Radcliff's
Exrs. v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.
Y. 195. And see Lewis, Eminent
Domain, , 96, and cases cited.
But as will be seen by a casual
reference to the authorities, the
primary doctrine that damages by
authorized public works to property
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not taken may be recovered, is
itself of recent growth.
The rule forbidding recovery for
change of street grade has been
established prior to the constitutional changes admitting recovery
for damages to property not taken.
Now that these damages are generally recoverable, the case of
damages from changes in the street
grade should follow the constitutional change.
In some States these damages
were recoverable before the change.
See the Wisconsin authorities, cited
supra and Ill. Grand Rapids, etc.
Co. v. II Heisel, II N. W. Rep.
(Mich.), 212 ; Eaton v. B. C. & M.
R. Co., 51 N. H., 504; and in some
they have been made specially recoverable by statutes thereon. See
Ind. R. S., 188i, 3073 ; Iowa Code,
469; Mass. Sts., C. 44, I9, 20. For
changes in the grade of streets of
New York City, N. Y., see laws of
1852, C. 52, p. 46, 47; 2 L. 1867, C.
697, pp. 1748, 50 2 N. Y. L., 1872,
C. 729, p. 1726; Pennsylvania. See
matter of change of grade of Fifth
and Sixth Streets, 12 Phila., 587.
For a collection of decisions on
these statutes, see Lewis, Em. D.,
f. 207-218.
The constitutional change itself
is an interesting piece of history.
In the early history of the country
the rule had been settled, except in
a few jurisdictions, that damages
to property not taken could not be
recovered.
By the Illinois Constitution of
1870, the constitutional provision
was made to read: "Private property shall not be taken or daimaged for public use without just
compensation."
So far as the
writer has been able to astertain,
this was the first constitutional
provision expressly extending the
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remedy to damages to property not
taken: Ill. Cont., 187o, Art. II,
13, I Starr & Curtis; Ill. Statutes,
p. 105, 1037.
Similar provisions have been
since adopted in several States as
follows: West Virginia, Art. III,
9, in 1872; Pennsylvania (taken,
injured or destroyed), Art. I, 8,
1873; Arkansas (taken, damaged
or destroyed), Art. II, . 22, 1874;
BMissouri, Art. I, 20, in 1875; Nebraska, Art. J,
21, in 1875; Alabama (same as Pennsylvania), Art.
XIII, . 7, 1875; Texas, Art. I, 17,
in 1876; Colorado, Art. II,
14, in
1876.
In England, the Land Clauses
Consolidation Act of 1845 (Q 68)
allows recovery of compensation
for property "injuriously affected;"
and this has been repeatedly construed to include damages to property not taken: Hall v. Mayor of
Bristol, L. R., 2 C. P., 322; Ripley
v. Great Northern R. R. Co., L. R.,
io Ch. App., 435The rule is, therefore, now well
established in this country and
England, and we may expect that
it will become universal.
The limitation indicated in the
opinion that the damage or injury
must be "physical;" and that it
will not include damages by obstruction of view, by noise, vibration, etc., results from an application
to the questior of various rules in
the law of easements, including the
right to build indefinitely, upward
or downward, etc.
But a moment's reflection satisfies any one that "view"
is a
"physical'I attribute, an injury to
which is a physical injury; that

noise and vibration are "physical'"
phenomena, and so far as injurious
are physical injuries. A judicial
definition of "physical,"
which
would exclude these injuries, is unscientific and destined to modification. The language of the rule
will be changed, and possibly the
rule itself.
On principle there is ample room
for argument that, in the compulsory divesting of one person's
rights and investing of another
persons' corresponding rights, for a
fair compensation and fixed price,
the divesting of one person's rights
to view, to freedom from unwholesome surroundings, or to freedom
from noise and vibration are elements to be included in the compensation. The right to the enjoynient of these is not pihysical, but
no right to enjoyment is physical.
The objects to which these rights
apply and the media through which.
they are enjoyed and their relation
to the coipus of the property taken
are physical just as much as in any
other case. The effect of such
divestiture of rights is visible in
the market value of the property
and is measured by dollars and
cents in the real estate world just
as much as any other.
As the effect of the constitutional
provisions above cited has been to
enlarge indefinitely the scope of
damages to be compensated, it may
be anticipated that there will be a
tendency to still further extend the
field and to embrace all elements
which affect the market value of
the property.
MERRITT STARR.

Chicago,jruly 25, 1892.

